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A B S T R A C T   
Judgment of confidence in memory is likely to track memory accuracy if those factors shaping accuracy also 
shape confidence. In recognition memory, accuracy is determined by the relative level of evidence present for the 
target and that supporting the lures. As the discrepancy between targets and lures increases, so does the like-
lihood of correct responding. In contrast, this study shows that confidence can instead depend on the absolute 
evidence supporting the chosen target rather than the balance of evidence between targets and lures. In four 
experiments, using different types of forced-choice recognition tests, we demonstrate that generally manipulating 
the strength of evidence supporting targets affects confidence judgments but that varying the strength of evi-
dence supporting lures creates robust confidence-accuracy dissociations, changing accuracy while not affecting 
confidence. Together, these data support an absolute account of confidence in forced-choice recognition and 
demonstrate that confidence-accuracy dissociations across recognition conditions are likely to be ubiquitous.   
Introduction 
Everyday disclosures involving memory are often accompanied by 
statements of confidence. Thus, for example, a witness trying to describe 
a person who committed a crime might say that ‘He wore a black jacket, 
I am 100% certain of this’. Such expressions of confidence are the topic 
of studies concerned with establishing how confidence judgments relate 
to memory performance. This can be assessed either for confidence in 
future memory performance, expressed in so-called judgments of 
learning (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992; Koriat, 1997; Zawadzka & Higham, 
2016), or confidence in past memory reports, often referred to as 
retrospective confidence judgments (Mazancieux, Fleming, Souchay, & 
Moulin, 2020; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010). There are numerous ex-
amples in the literature where conditions giving rise to higher judgments 
of learning actually result in memory performance that is no different or 
even lower than the comparison conditions (e.g., Besken & Mulligan, 
2013; Rhodes & Castel, 2008; Undorf, Zimdahl, & Bernstein, 2017), but 
this is less often reported for retrospective confidence judgments. In the 
present study, we examine a specific format of memory testing in which 
participants have to choose among two potential answers to a memory 
question – the two-alternative forced-choice recognition test – and 
scrutinize conditions under which retrospective confidence judgments 
become dissociated from memory performance.1 
The issue of retrospective confidence judgments is particularly 
important when the outcome of the memory test has material conse-
quences, such as for eyewitness testimony. A recent surge in discussion 
of confidence judgments in the context of memory reports is related to 
the issue of line-ups. Line-up identification comprises a more complex 
version of a forced-choice recognition test, with an additional option of 
rejecting a line-up if the culprit is not included. Investigators and jurors 
often rely on expressions of confidence accompanying identification 
decisions in such situations (see Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & 
Roediger, 2015, for a discussion). In this context, it is vital to know 
whether high confidence can be interpreted in terms of high likelihood 
that a corresponding memory judgment is accurate. There is general 
agreement that, at least for eyewitnesses who choose a suspect from a 
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line-up, identification confidence typically tracks accuracy (e.g., Brewer 
& Wells, 2016; Wixted & Wells, 2017), at least when memory is tested 
for the first time. Thus, identifications made with the highest levels of 
confidence can be generally considered to be also highly accurate (but 
see Grabman, Dobolyi, Berelovich, & Dodson, 2019, for exceptions). 
Similarly, in experimental studies on memory and confidence, using 
more artificial materials like pictures or lists of words, the positive 
relationship between the two is well documented, inasmuch as more 
accurate responses are accompanied by higher confidence, at least for 
materials that are not deceptive (Brewer & Sampaio, 2006; Koriat, 
2012). While this overall empirical relationship is well established, there 
is relatively little work to show how confidence judgments are formed in 
the memory domain, or why, in some circumstances, they fail to track 
accuracy. 
Confidence-accuracy relationships can be analyzed in a range of 
ways, delineated in a thorough overview by Roediger, Wixted, and 
DeSoto (2012; see also Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 2001). One 
question, for example, may be whether on average responses that a 
given person provides with high confidence are more likely to be correct 
than responses which the same person provides with lower confidence. 
This approach – referred to as an investigation of metacognitive reso-
lution – is often vital to studies concerned with self-regulated remem-
bering (e.g., Higham, 2002, 2007; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996), as well as 
eyewitness research, but it does not allow for a systematic analysis of the 
bases of confidence-accuracy relationships. For this purpose, an exper-
imental approach is necessary where independent variables are 
manipulated and their influence on accuracy and confidence examined. 
In other words, when the experimental approach is adopted it is not the 
influence of experimental variables on resolution that is of interest but 
rather the influence of these variables separately on accuracy and con-
fidence. The confidence-accuracy relationship is then derived from 
assessing whether a given manipulation affects both average accuracy 
and confidence in the same way – a positive relationship across exper-
imental conditions – or whether a given manipulation dissociates con-
fidence from accuracy, when a positive relationship fails to emerge. 
The experimental approach to confidence-accuracy relationships can 
take two forms. Researchers can find a variable which affects confidence 
and examine whether it exerts the same type of influence on accuracy, or 
they can find a variable which affects accuracy and examine whether it 
exerts the same type of influence on confidence. There is ample evidence 
for cases in which confidence is shaped by factors that do not affect 
accuracy. For example, positive feedback after a recognition decision is 
highly likely to increase one’s confidence in this decision while obvi-
ously no longer being able to affect its accuracy (Semmler, Brewer, & 
Wells, 2004). Also, spurious familiarity of memory items may affect 
confidence in recognition decisions when the accuracy of these decisions 
depends on associative information rather than item familiarity (Hanc-
zakowski, Pasek, Zawadzka, & Mazzoni, 2013). Thus, confidence- 
accuracy dissociations can be created when factors that do not exert 
influence on accuracy of memory responses are, nevertheless, used to 
arrive at confidence assessments for these responses. 
The present study, on the other hand, focuses on the second, less 
often adopted form of the experimental approach to investigating 
confidence-accuracy relationships. Here we ask the question of how 
confidence is affected by experimental manipulations known to affect 
memory accuracy in forced-choice recognition tests. This is a vital 
problem inasmuch as it speaks to the prevalence of confidence-accuracy 
dissociations under those testing conditions. If every single manipula-
tion that affects memory accuracy can be expected to affect confidence 
in the same way, then confidence should track accuracy across a wide 
variety of encoding and retrieval conditions. The overall level of confi-
dence can then be generally used to infer the quality of encoding and 
retrieval unless a particular misleading cue can be identified that is 
likely to spuriously affect confidence. 
The received view on whether factors affecting accuracy generally 
affect confidence in the same way is that they almost uniformly do. For 
example, Pleskac and Busemeyer (2010) in their overview of confidence 
models identified – based on numerous studies from various domains – 
the pattern of ‘positive relationship between stimulus discriminability 
and observed confidence’ (p. 869) as one of the main empirical regu-
larities that any viable model of confidence needs to explain. Impor-
tantly, the same has been claimed in reference specifically to studies on 
memory reporting. In their overview of research on confidence-accuracy 
relationship in recognition, Roediger et al. (2012) concluded that 
“confidence and accuracy seem well correlated in this kind of experi-
ment in which independent variables are manipulated. In fact, the ex-
ceptions are sufficiently few that we can safely conclude that when an 
independent variable affects accuracy of memory reports, subjects’ 
confidence in those reports will virtually always be affected the same 
way (however, see Tulving, 1981, for a somewhat different case)” (p. 
98). 
Before moving to the discussion of a study by Tulving (1981) – one of 
seemingly very few exceptions to a generally strong confidence- 
accuracy relationship in experimental research (see Busey et al., 2001; 
Chandler, 1994; Starns & Ksander, 2016, for other examples) – it is 
important to consider the reasons why such a generally strong rela-
tionship might exist. One possibility is that people have privileged ac-
cess to the contents of their own memory, allowing them to be confident 
when they feel that the right information is stored in memory. This gives 
rise almost inevitably to correct responses and results in lower confi-
dence only when relevant information is not stored, a condition which 
also produces more erroneous responses. However, despite its intuitive 
appeal, this so-called direct-access view (Hart, 1965) has long been 
abandoned in research on metacognitive judgments – of which retro-
spective confidence judgments are an example – in favor of a cue- 
utilization view (Koriat, 1997). 
According to the cue-utilization view, people formulate their meta-
cognitive judgments based on a variety of cues that are often by- 
products of the process of memory search itself. Thus, for example, 
people are confident in their responses when relevant memories are 
retrieved fluently (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993). Since correct memories are 
also, by and large, retrieved more fluently than erroneous responses, this 
generally results in a positive confidence-accuracy relationship. Impor-
tantly, a manipulation that positively affects fluency of retrieval – for 
example greater opportunity for rehearsal of to-be-remembered items 
(Busey et al., 2001) – will simultaneously benefit memory performance 
and increase confidence. Thus, positive confidence-accuracy relation-
ships across experimental conditions are to be expected when confi-
dence is based on the same cues that determine the accuracy of 
recognition decisions (Reinitz, Peria, Séguin, & Loftus, 2011). When 
these cues are different – such as in the case of feedback that follows 
recognition decisions – confidence and accuracy start to diverge. 
To achieve complete understanding of the confidence-accuracy 
relationship in recognition decisions one thus needs to consider more 
fully what determines recognition accuracy. This question is vital as it 
enables assessing whether the same factors influence confidence. On one 
level, this is a daunting task with which researchers have been struggling 
for many years. However, at the very basic level of analysis it is 
reasonable to suppose that the accuracy of forced-choice recognition 
decisions depends on balance of memory evidence supporting alterna-
tives in this test. Memory evidence might reflect a continuous unitary 
signal (Wixted, 2007), a conglomerate of different signals (Yonelinas, 
1994, 2002), or discrete memory states (Bröder & Schütz, 2009), but no 
matter which conceptualization is adopted, it remains the case that the 
stronger the evidence gathered in support of targets and the weaker the 
evidence gathered in support of lures, the more accurate the responding 
in this test will be. This holds even if a person does not consider both 
alternatives. Recently, it has been argued that in forced-choice recog-
nition tests participants can turn the decision on some trials into a quasi- 
old/new recognition test (Jou, Flores, Cortes, & Leka, 2016; Starns, 
Chen, & Staub, 2017). This involves considering only one alternative 
and making an absolute judgment, endorsing it if it crosses a certain 
M. Hanczakowski et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Journal of Memory and Language 117 (2021) 104189
3
criterial level of evidence. Even in this situation, stronger evidence for 
targets and weaker evidence for non-targets should shape correct 
responding. 
If accuracy in forced-choice recognition depends on a difference in 
evidence supporting recognition alternatives, then one can expect a 
strong confidence-accuracy relationship if confidence is also based on 
this difference. If it is, then any change in the balance of evidence will be 
reflected in both accuracy and confidence, giving rise to a positive 
confidence-accuracy relationship across experimental conditions. The 
fact that positive accuracy-confidence relationships are ubiquitously 
observed – as summarized by Roediger et al. (2012) – has resulted in 
models of retrospective confidence judgments in forced-choice tests 
which explicitly assume that confidence is indeed based on the balance 
of evidence between alternatives (Horry & Brewer, 2016; Pleskac & 
Busemeyer, 2010). However, although such relative accounts of confi-
dence continue to be widely held, recent lines of evidence suggest that 
confidence in forced-choice decisions generally, and forced-choice 
recognition in particular, may not necessarily be based on the balance 
of evidence. 
Empirical patterns which point to confidence in forced-choice de-
cisions reflecting solely evidence supporting the chosen alternative – 
what will be henceforth referred to as the absolute account of confidence 
in forced-choice decisions – first emerged in research on perception. 
Zylberberg, Barttfeld, and Sigman (2012) examined retrospective con-
fidence regarding decisions concerning luminance of stimuli or direction 
of movements and revealed that confidence was independent of evi-
dence supporting the unchosen alternative, contrary to the predictions 
of the relative, balance-of-evidence account. More importantly from the 
present perspective, analogous results have been described in the 
domain of memory. Jou et al. (2016) were the first to suggest that in 
forced-choice recognition tests participants may also base their confi-
dence on the assessment of evidence supporting only the chosen alter-
native. In their Experiment 1B, Jou et al. administered a standard two- 
alternative forced-choice recognition test for studied words, coupled 
with confidence judgments. Somewhat untypically, some trials on this 
test consisted of two studied words as alternatives. Surprisingly, confi-
dence for such deceptive trials was higher than for the more conven-
tional trials in which one studied word and one non-studied word were 
presented as recognition alternatives. This pattern of results is not 
consistent with the balance-of-evidence account of confidence inasmuch 
as the difference in evidence should be larger on trials consisting of a 
studied and a non-studied alternative (target-lure pair) than on those 
with two studied alternatives (target-target pair). However, this pattern 
can be accommodated by the absolute account of confidence, in which 
an alternative chosen from a target-target pair – essentially the stronger 
of two studied words – should be associated with more evidence than an 
alternative chosen from a target-lure pair, where the target needs to 
exceed a lower criterion of strength in order to be endorsed. 
That confidence in forced-choice recognition decisions depends on 
absolute evidence for the chosen alternative – rather than the balance of 
evidence across alternatives – has recently been confirmed in a study by 
Zawadzka, Higham, and Hanczakowski (2017), who examined confi-
dence judgments in forced-choice recognition using the plurals para-
digm (Hintzman, Curran, & Oppy, 1992). The use of the plurals 
paradigm allowed the strength of targets and lures to be varied inde-
pendently via the number of presentations of their parent words (e.g., 
‘frogs’ constituted a strong lure if ‘frog’ was studied multiple times). This 
study showed that, when making confidence judgments, participants 
considered evidence supporting the chosen alternative while at the same 
time virtually ignoring the strength of evidence supporting the unchosen 
alternative, thus creating a dissociation between accuracy and confi-
dence: Participants were more likely to choose a target when a lure was 
weak but still confidence reflected only support for the target and not 
support for the lure. 
Further evidence for the absolute account of confidence is provided 
by Miyoshi, Kuwahara, and Kawaguchi (2018), who focused on forced- 
choice recognition decisions concerning pictures. They demonstrated 
that when incorrect responses are made for recognition trials including 
highly memorable studied pictures, confidence is higher than when 
incorrect responses are made on trials including studied pictures of 
lower memorability. Once again, this pattern is the opposite of what the 
balance-of-evidence account would predict but it is easily accommo-
dated within the absolute account if the endorsed incorrect alternatives 
are particularly strong when pitted against highly memorable 
competitors. 
The studies by Jou et al. (2016), Zawadzka et al. (2017), and Miyoshi 
et al. (2018) demonstrate that confidence in forced-choice recognition 
may not depend on the difference in evidence supporting alternatives at 
test, which is the factor that shapes the accuracy of recognition de-
cisions. Hence, confidence-accuracy dissociations across experimental 
conditions should be observable when the strength of evidence sup-
porting lures is varied. Such manipulations should change the balance of 
evidence across alternatives, yet at the same time not affect confidence 
(in correct responses), which seems to depend on the strength of 
endorsed targets. The significance of such dissociations has passed un-
noticed until now, possibly because studies concerned with forced- 
choice recognition have employed manipulations that systematically 
varied only the strength of targets (e.g., Palmer, Brewer, Weber, & 
Nagesh, 2013). Consistent with this idea, the one demonstration of a 
confidence-accuracy dissociation across experimental conditions cited 
earlier – the study of Tulving (1981), to which we now return – included 
manipulations of lures rather than targets. 
In Tulving’s study (1981; see also Dobbins, Kroll, & Liu, 1998; 
Heathcote, Bora, & Freeman, 2010, for conceptual replications), par-
ticipants studied halves of exterior scenes that included landscapes, 
buildings, etc. In a subsequent forced-choice recognition test, three 
conditions were included. In the A-A’ condition, old halves (A) were 
paired with their corresponding non-studied halves (A’). In the A-B’ 
condition, old halves were paired with non-studied halves of different 
studied images (B’). In the A-X condition, old halves were paired with 
novel halves of pictures, not corresponding to any of the studied pictures 
(X). With these conditions, Tulving was able to bring about two 
confidence-accuracy dissociations. 
In the first dissociation, while performance in the A-A’ condition was 
slightly higher than performance in the A-B’ condition (a difference of 
six percentage points in Experiment 1), confidence in correct responses 
was actually higher in the A-B’ condition. This can be explained by 
assuming that both accuracy and confidence depend on the difference in 
evidence supporting the alternatives, with an additional important 
contribution of variance of this difference, which is restricted in the A-A’ 
condition (because evidence for both alternatives is underpinned by the 
same memory representation) but increased in the A-B’ condition (see 
Clark, 1997). Limited variance of difference in evidence means that even 
small differences in evidence are highly diagnostic and this serves to 
boost recognition accuracy, while small average differences in evidence 
between two alternatives reduce confidence. We will return to this issue 
later, in Experiment 4 of the present study. 
The second dissociation documented by Tulving (1981) – which to 
the best of our knowledge has not attracted attention of other re-
searchers – is that that there was no appreciable difference in confidence 
in correct responses between the A-B’ condition and the A-X condition, 
while at the same time performance in the A-X condition was markedly 
higher than in the A-B’ condition (a difference of 19 percentage points in 
Experiment 1). This striking pattern can be explained if one assumes that 
confidence does not rely on the difference in strength of alternatives but 
instead is dependent solely upon the strength of the chosen alternative. 
When comparing A-B’ to A-X this strength of the chosen target should be 
similar, determined mostly by the memory trace of A, hence confidence 
in correct decisions should be roughly equivalent. However, the task is 
more difficult when pitting two alternatives which are each similar to 
studied items (as in the A-B’ condition) than when pitting one old 
against one completely novel alternative against each other (as in the A- 
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X condition). This results in equivalent confidence judgments, along 
with a marked difference in recognition performance: a confidence- 
accuracy dissociation. 
The novel account of confidence in recognition decisions put forward 
here suggests that confidence in forced-choice recognition judgments is 
subject to a form of confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), in that it as-
sumes that confidence depends on absolute evidence supporting the 
chosen alternative rather than on relative evidence for all recognition 
alternatives. In doing so, it explains the results obtained by Tulving 
(1981) for the A-B’ and A-X comparison and also suggests that 
confidence-accuracy dissociations in forced-choice tasks may be much 
more prevalent than previously thought. In a nutshell, a dissociation 
should be observed whenever forced-choice recognition performance is 
reduced by making lures stronger, thus modulating the difference in 
evidence between target and lure, but holding the absolute evidence for 
the target (and hence confidence in the choice) constant. 
This principle of absolute evidence also sheds new light on previous 
results from our own group. Beaman, Hanczakowski, and Jones (2014) 
examined the role of auditory distraction on metacognitive monitoring. 
Only a subset of these results is relevant here, the inadvertent discovery 
of a striking confidence-accuracy dissociation: a difference in accuracy 
across conditions was accompanied by a difference in confidence in the 
opposite direction. This dissociation was obtained – though not dis-
cussed at the time – when accuracy and confidence responses were 
recorded across two types of recognition tests for lists of randomly 
paired nouns. In an associative recognition test, participants were pre-
sented with one pair intact from the study phase and one pair comprising 
study words in a novel combination. The task here was to distinguish the 
familiar pairing from the unfamiliar pairing. The item recognition test 
used the same study items, but the two pairs of items presented at test 
now comprised one pair of items rearranged from study and one pair 
comprising two novel words. The task here was to identify the pair made 
up of the two studied words, regardless of their original pairing2. Ac-
curacy in the item recognition test was higher than in the associative 
recognition test, but at the same time confidence was lower. 
These results can be readily explained by the absolute account of 
confidence in forced-choice recognition. Unsurprisingly, because the 
item recognition test used novel words as lures, the difference in 
strength of memory evidence between targets and lures is greater in this 
test than in the associative test that comprises words already encoun-
tered in the experiment. Accordingly, accuracy is greater in the item 
recognition test. A different pattern emerges when confidence is 
considered. The target pair in the associative recognition test is sup-
ported by evidence for both individual words and their association. By 
contrast, the basis for choice of the target pair in the item recognition 
test rests only on the evidence for individual words: The pairing of words 
is not germane to recognition accuracy. If confidence depends solely on 
evidence supporting the chosen alternative—an absolute judgement that 
ignores the evidence for the unchosen alternative—then it should be 
paradoxically higher in the more difficult associative recognition test, as 
observed by Beaman et al. If these results reflect the workings of an 
absolute evidence heuristic of yielding confidence judgments, then this 
significantly broadens the remit of this particular account of confidence 
in forced-choice recognition by demonstrating its workings within 
complex memory tasks involving both item and associative information. 
While previous studies that can either be interpreted as consistent with 
the absolute account (Jou et al., 2016; Tulving 1981) or were designed 
to specifically test this hypothesis (Miyoshi et al., 2018; Zawadzka et al., 
2017) used simple materials such as individual words or pictures, the 
study by Beaman et al. (2014) required choosing among pairs of words 
that differed both in item information and associative information. The 
observed crossover confidence-accuracy dissociation suggests that both 
in tests that require access to item information (the item recognition 
test) and tests that require access to associative information (the asso-
ciative recognition test), the same principles for rendering confidence 
judgments are likely to operate. 
However, while suggestive, the Beaman et al. (2014) results are not 
definitive inasmuch as they were an unanticipated outcome of a setting 
designed for other purposes. Additionally, one technical feature of their 
procedure is troubling: the length of the test list between associative and 
item recognition tests was equated, and equal to the number of the pairs 
in the study list. This meant that for the item recognition test each word 
was used once during the test but for the associative recognition test 
each word was actually used twice – once for the intact pair and once for 
a rearranged pair. Thus, individual words accrued more familiarity in 
the associative recognition test by virtue of their repeated presentation 
in the test phase. The pattern of confidence documented by Beaman 
et al. might therefore be explicable by this increased familiarity with test 
words in the associative recognition test rather than by the absolute 
account of confidence judgments in forced-choice recognition. 
The current study presents four new experiments free of this 
confound and demonstrate how confidence in forced-choice recognition 
is a function of memory evidence supporting the chosen alternative, 
leading to robust dissociations of confidence and accuracy of recognition 
decisions. We first isolate the dissociation, then provide a direct test of 
the absolute account of confidence-accuracy relationships that attri-
butes accuracy to the difference in strength between the assessed al-
ternatives and confidence solely to the strength of chosen alternatives. 
Finally, we broaden the scope of our investigation by demonstrating 
how confidence in forced-choice recognition can still be sensitive to the 
type of lures used in particular test trials, even when evidence sup-
porting these lures is not factored into confidence judgments. Together, 
these experiments show that, decades of theorizing notwithstanding (see 
Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010, for a review), changes in forced-choice 
recognition accuracy across experimental conditions need not be asso-
ciated with parallel changes in confidence. 
Experiment 1 
Here, we compare accuracy and confidence levels in an associative 
recognition test and an item recognition test that used rearranged pairs 
as targets. A schematic outline of the two types of test used in this 
experiment is presented in Fig. 1. In the associative recognition test, on 
each trial an intact studied pair was presented along with a pair of words 
drawn from different studied pairs, and the task was to pick the pair that 
was presented in the study phase. Here, all words were equally familiar – 
the item information is equated – but the target pair also had the asso-
ciation created at study. Accordingly, in the associative recognition test 
alternatives differ in associative information only. In the item recogni-
tion test, rearranged pairs served as targets, and lures were created by 
pairing two novel words, not presented before in the experiment. In the 
item recognition test alternatives differ mostly with respect to item in-
formation, as even the target has no associative information as legacy 
from the study phase. Participants’ task here was to pick the target 
containing words from study, necessarily drawn from two different pairs 
in the study list. 
Based on the results presented by Beaman et al. (2014), we expected 
greater accuracy in the item recognition test which used familiar words – 
albeit in a novel pairing – as targets, and novel, unfamiliar words as 
lures, in contrast to the associative recognition test with familiar targets 
and familiar lures. The main focus of the experiment is on confidence 
patterns. We expected to replicate the pattern of lower confidence levels 
for correct responses in the item recognition test. This pattern of lower 
confidence in correct item recognition decisions, despite higher overall 
accuracy, was predicted because confidence reflects support for the 
chosen alternative only, not the difference in evidence between alter-
natives. Targets should be stronger in the associative recognition test, 
2 Beaman et al. (2014) used different names for the tests, referring to the item 
recognition test as the recombined test, and referring to the item+association 
test, introduced here in Experiment 3, as the simple recognition test. 
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since target memory strength is a joint function of both item and asso-
ciative information. In the item recognition test memory for the asso-
ciation would be absent, giving lower memory strength leading to lower 
confidence. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty Cardiff University students participated in exchange for course 
credit. The sample size was chosen to be comparable to the one used by 
Beaman et al. (2014), who tested 42 participants. 
Design 
The experiment used a 2 (test type: associative recognition vs. item 
recognition) × 2 (test length: short vs. long) design. The conditions were 
manipulated within participants but between studied lists, with one list 
of pairs of words assigned to each of the four conditions. This assignment 
was counterbalanced across participants. 
In the associative test, participants were asked to distinguish be-
tween intact and rearranged pairs, whereas in the item test participants 
were asked to distinguish between rearranged and novel pairs. The test 
length factor manipulated the effect of the number of presentations of 
individual words at test. Specifically, the long test condition included the 
confound present in the study by Beaman et al. (2014) with each studied 
pair from a list assigned to the associative test serving as a source of 
words for one intact and one rearranged test pair. In this way, each in-
dividual word was presented twice. In the item test, each studied word 
was included in only one rearranged pair and thus was presented at test 
once only. By contrast, the short test condition removed this confound. 
Thus, each studied pair from a list assigned to the associative test con-
dition served either as a source of words for an intact or a rearranged 
pair. This meant that only half of a studied list could be used for creating 
targets in this test, so that the length of the test was half that experienced 
in the long test condition. A short item test, also using only half of 
studied pairs as a source for test pairs, was included in the design to 
control for the test length (thus equating fatigue, output interference, 
and so on, in both short test conditions). 
Materials 
A cohort of 440 words was chosen from the MRC database of which 
320 were used to create four lists of 40 pairs of words for study and the 
remaining 120 words were used to create novel pairs for the item 
recognition tests. For each list, four types of test were created. 
For the long associative test, all pairs were included as 40 intact pairs 
and words from all pairs were also reshuffled to create 40 rearranged 
pairs. For the short associative test, half of the pairs were randomly 
chosen to serve as 20 intact pairs and the words from the other half were 
recombined to create 20 rearranged pairs. For the long item test, words 
from all pairs were recombined to create 40 rearranged pairs and 
additional 40 pairs of unstudied words were added as novel pairs. For 
the short item test, half of the pairs were randomly chosen and the words 
from these pairs were recombined to create 20 rearranged pairs; an 
additional 20 pairs of unstudied words were also added as novel pairs. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested on individual computers. They were given 
four lists of 40 pairs to study—each pair shown for 1500 ms, with a 500 
ms interstimulus interval—and each list was immediately followed by a 
self-paced test in one of the four experimental conditions. The order of 
conditions was randomly determined for each participant. 
The nature of the target and lure pairs for each test was carefully 
explained in the instructions preceding the test. The tests took form of 
two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) recognition. Target pairs (either 
intact or rearranged) were presented simultaneously with a lure pair 
Dog – Spoon
Tree – Hospital
Bottle –Watch
Associative Item
Dog – Spoon (Target) Tree – Watch (Target)
Tree – Watch (Lure) Cookie – Crow (Lure)
Associative Item Item+Association
Dog – Spoon (Target) Tree – Watch (Target) Dog – Spoon (Target)
Tree – Watch (Lure) Cookie – Crow (Lure) Cookie – Crow (Lure)
Low choice similarity High choice similarity
Dog – Spoon (Target) Dog – Spoon (Target)
Tree – Watch (Lure) Dog – Watch (Lure)
Study phase for all experiments
Test phase for Experiments 1 and 2
Test phase for Experiment 3
Test phase for Experiment 4
Fig. 1. The examples of word pairs used as targets 
and lures in different types of test conditions in 
Experiments 1–4. All experiments used unrelated 
word pairs as study materials. Experiments 1 and 2 
contrasted two testing conditions: (1) Associative, 
where intact pairs served as targets and rearranged 
pairs served as lures, (2) Item, where rearranged 
pairs served as targets and novel pairs served as 
lures. Experiment 3 added a novel testing condition 
– Item + Association – where intact pairs served as 
targets and novel pairs served as lures. Thus, the 
Item + Association condition had the same targets 
as the Associative condition and the same lures as 
the Item condition. Experiment 4 used only asso-
ciative recognition tests and contrasted conditions 
of Low choice similarity, with intact and rearranged 
pairs composed of different words, and High choice 
similarity, with intact and rearranged pairs sharing 
the first word.   
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(either rearranged or novel). For each test trial, participants were asked 
to endorse the target pair. Immediately after providing their response, 
participants were asked to judge their confidence that this response was 
correct by typing in their confidence judgment on a scale from 50 
(chance level in a 2AFC test) to 100%. 
Results and discussion 
The descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. Hit rates were sub-
jected to a 2 (test type) × 2 (test length) repeated-measures ANOVA, 
which yielded a significant main effect of test type, F(1, 39) = 7.96, MSE 
= .04, p = .007, ηp2 = .17, with accuracy higher in the item (M = .81, SD 
= .15) than in the associative test (M = .72, SD = .15), but no main effect 
of test length, F(1, 39) = 0.15, MSE = .01, p = .696, ηp2 = .004, and no 
interaction, F(1, 39) = 1.27, MSE = .01, p = .267, ηp2 = .03. This confirms 
higher performance in the item recognition test. 
The analyses of confidence data focused on confidence in correct 
responses, for which the absolute account of confidence makes specific 
predictions. Confidence in incorrect decisions was not analyzed because 
generally high levels of memory performance resulted in noisy data, 
with many incomplete cells. Here, the main effect of test type, F(1, 39) =
4.97, MSE = .01, p = .032, ηp2 = .11, stemmed from significantly lower 
confidence in the item (M = 75, SD = 13) than the associative test (M =
78, SD = 11). The main effect of test length was not significant, F(1, 39) 
= 3.03, MSE = .003, p = .090, ηp2 = .07, nor was the interaction, F(1, 39) 
= 3.21, MSE = .01, p = .081, ηp2 = .08.3 
The results of the present experiment show the predicted cross-over 
pattern of accuracy and confidence, which rules out a possibility that the 
confidence-accuracy dissociation obtained by Beaman et al. (2014) was 
a mere confound of the number of item presentations during test. We 
argue that this cross-over pattern in confidence and accuracy measures 
arises because when deciding about confidence in their recognition 
decisions, participants consider solely the absolute memory evidence 
supporting the alternative they endorsed as a target, ignoring evidence 
that would support the unchosen alternative. When associative and item 
recognition tests are contrasted, this absolute evidence for the chosen 
alternative is stronger in the associative than the item recognition tests. 
Targets endorsed in the associative recognition test are supported by 
both memory evidence indicating that individual items were studied and 
memory evidence indicating that a particular association linking two 
words was established at study. Note that while the use of item infor-
mation within an associative recognition test may seem unintuitive 
because in this test all individual words were actually presented in the 
study phase, a large number of studies indicate that participants use this 
kind of non-diagnostic evidence in associative recognition tests (e.g., 
Buchler, Light, & Reder, 2008; Malmberg & Xu, 2007). By comparison, 
the chosen alternatives in the item recognition tests are supported 
mostly by evidence gathered for individual items. Evidence for associ-
ations is largely unavailable because these associations are not re- 
established at the time of a memory test (see Cohn & Moscovitch, 
2007). Thus, on average there is more evidence supporting the chosen 
correct alternatives in the associative than in the item recognition test, 
resulting in higher confidence in this test, a pattern directly opposite to 
the pattern of recognition accuracy. 
It is important to remain mindful that the cross-over dissociation 
between accuracy and confidence observed in Experiment 1 refers to a 
comparison of different memory tests for the same study materials. Even 
when confidence becomes dissociated from accuracy across testing 
conditions, it can still remain positively related within a test. To assess 
whether this is indeed the case, calibration curves for data pooled across 
participants separately for two types of test (collapsed across the test 
length factor) are presented in Fig. 2. 
Visual inspection of the calibration curves reveals a clear positive 
relationship between confidence and accuracy on both tests. Thus, even 
though the use of different tests of memory dissociates confidence from 
accuracy across tests, confidence remains monotonically related to ac-
curacy within a test. Note also that the calibration plots reveal that the 
curve for the item test is placed consistently higher than the curve for the 
associative test demonstrating that, at each level of accuracy, responses 
provided in the item test are given with lower confidence. This result 
indicates that the difference in confidence across tests is a general 
property of the data and is not caused solely by the most confidently held 
responses. 
Experiment 1 revealed a striking dissociation between accuracy and 
confidence by which more accurate responding in the item recognition 
test was associated with less confidence. The robustness of this partic-
ular empirical pattern, however, has yet to be established. A potential 
criticism of our manipulation of the type of test is that the item recog-
nition test – as implemented in our study – is somewhat unusual in that it 
requires endorsing as targets items that were not actually studied in the 
same form as presented in the test. While endorsing intact pairs as tar-
gets in the associative recognition test seems like a standard memory 
task, participants may become perplexed when asked to endorse 
particular combinations that were not actually studied – even though 
they comprise studied words – in the item recognition task. Being asked 
to do so could undermine their confidence in the decisions they make. 
In Experiment 2 we sought a way of augmenting confidence by 
reassuring our participants that decisions they make in the item recog-
nition task are by-and-large correct. To this end, we introduced feedback 
for recognition decisions in the procedure for Experiment 2. Previous 
studies indicate that feedback in recognition generally does not serve to 
improve accuracy (Kantner & Lindsay, 2010) so we do not predict any 
effects of this change in the procedure on the accuracy patterns. How-
ever, providing feedback across conditions differing in accuracy should 
boost confidence specifically in a condition in which accuracy is higher. 
With higher accuracy, participants should generally receive more cor-
rect feedback, which should then serve to augment confidence in 
recognition decisions they make. Here, interest centers on whether 
feedback would be sufficient to remove the confidence-accuracy 
Table 1 
Proportions of hits (accuracy) and means of confidence judgments for correct 
responses as a function of type of test (Experiments 1–3) and length of test 
(Experiments 1–2) conditions in Experiments 1–3. Standard deviations are 
provided in parentheses.   
Associative Item Item +
association 
Short Long Short Long 
Experiment 1      
Correct responses .73 
(.18) 
.71 
(.15) 
.80 
(.19) 
.81 
(.15) 
– 
Confidence in 
correct responses 
80 
(13) 
77 
(11) 
74 
(13) 
75 
(15) 
– 
Experiment 2      
Correct responses .66 
(.16) 
.69 
(.15) 
.84 
(.10) 
.80 
(.13) 
– 
Confidence in 
correct responses 
74 
(12) 
74 
(12) 
73 
(11) 
77 
(12) 
– 
Experiment 3      
Correct responses .73 
(.17) 
– .82 
(.14) 
– .84 (.13) 
Confidence in 
correct responses 
85 
(12) 
– 81 
(12) 
– 84 (10)  
3 Given that the aim of this experiment was to confirm that the same pattern 
as the one found by Beaman et al. (2014) would emerge without the list length 
confound, we additionally conducted t-tests on the results from the short tests 
only. The same cross-over pattern of confidence and accuracy was found in this 
restricted (comprising one-third of all tested pairs) data set, with confidence in 
correct responses being lower in the item than the associative test, t(39) = 2.73, 
p = .01, d = 0.43, while for accuracy levels the trend was in the opposite di-
rection, t(39) = 1.86, p = .069, d = 0.30. 
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dissociation revealed in Experiment 1. If not, the robustness of the 
confidence-accuracy dissociation would be underscored. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four Cardiff University students participated in exchange for 
course credit. The sample size was chosen to ensure the replication of the 
accuracy patterns observed in Experiment 1: with ηp2 = .17 for this 
comparison, the required sample size to obtain power of .95 was 23. 
Materials, design, and procedure 
All materials were the same as in Experiment 1. We also used the 
same design, which varied both the type of test and the length of the 
study list. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that observed pat-
terns of accuracy and confidence do not depend on the length of list and 
related repetition of words within the associative recognition test but the 
same design was here preserved in order to confirm this insight. The 
procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except for the feedback that 
was presented after each response in a memory test (displayed for 1.5 s), 
informing participants whether their response was correct. 
Results 
The descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. Hit rates were sub-
jected to a 2 (test type) × 2 (test length) repeated-measures ANOVA, 
which yielded significantly higher accuracy in the item recognition test 
(M = .82, SD = .10) than in the associative recognition test (M = .68, SD 
= .12), F(1, 23) = 22.74, MSE = .02, p < .001, ηp2 = .50, but no main 
effect of test length, F(1, 23) = 0.18, MSE = .01, p = .675, ηp2 = .008, and 
no interaction, F(1, 23) = 2.29, MSE = .01, p = .144, ηp2 = .09. This 
parallels the results of Experiment 1. The ANOVA for confidence in 
correct responses yielded no significant effects: F(1, 23) = 0.08, MSE =
.007, p = .774, ηp2 = .004, for the main effect of test type, F(1, 23) = 2.15, 
MSE = .004, p = .157, ηp2 = .09 for the main effect of test length, and F(1, 
23) = 1.55, MSE = .01, p = .226, ηp2 = .06 for the interaction. 
A visual analysis of calibration curves (see Fig. 2) reveals two things. 
First, there is again a positive relationship between confidence and ac-
curacy on both tests, pointing to a meaningful relationship between 
accuracy and confidence within each experimental condition. Second, 
the curve for the item recognition test is again consistently above the 
curve for the associative test, across all levels of accuracy. 
Providing feedback after each memory response seemed to boost 
Fig. 2. Calibration curves in Experiments 1–4, based on the data collapsed across participants and for Experiments 1–2 also across the test length factor. Separate 
curves are plotted for different types of tests: associative and item recognition in Experiments 1 and 2, associative, item recognition and item + association in 
Experiment 3, and high vs. low choice similarity associative recognition in Experiment 4. Perfect calibration, denoted as PC, is provided for comparison. 
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participants’ confidence to a higher level than in Experiment 1, to the 
point that there was no longer a significant difference in confidence 
between the associative and item recognition tasks. Nevertheless, dif-
ferences in accuracy between the two tasks remained: a substantial 
difference – 13 percentage points – between item and associative 
recognition test accuracy was coupled to levels of confidence roughly 
comparable in magnitude for both tests. 
The present results demonstrate that even with the provision of 
feedback pointing to highly accurate (81% correct) responding in the 
item recognition test, participants consistently undervalued the quality 
of their responses in this test, as compared to the associative recognition 
test. This is consistent with the absolute account of confidence in forced- 
choice recognition according to which confidence is based on evidence 
supporting the chosen alternative only, ignoring the evidence support-
ing unchosen alternatives. At the same time, as demonstrated by the 
calibration curves, confidence remains meaningfully related to accuracy 
within a given memory test. 
Experiment 3 
The aim of the first two experiments was to establish the veracity of 
the dissociation between accuracy and confidence first obtained by 
Beaman et al. (2014). The results presented so far are consistent in 
showing that while accuracy is higher when participants are asked to 
distinguish between intact and rearranged pairs than when they are 
asked to distinguish between rearranged and novel pairs, confidence 
does not track this difference. A particularly striking result was obtained 
in Experiment 1, where the confidence-accuracy dissociation took the 
shape of a cross-over pattern. This, we argue, was possible because by 
our test manipulation we varied simultaneously evidence supporting the 
chosen correct alternatives (targets) and the unchosen incorrect alter-
natives (lures). While variations in the former were responsible for dif-
ferences in confidence, variations in the latter drove differences in 
accuracy, resulting in the cross-over pattern overall. In Experiment 3, we 
aimed to provide additional evidence for this hypothesis. 
Arguably, the confidence-accuracy dissociation we expected to see 
has been thus far largely overlooked within the literature because 
memory studies tend to vary support for targets rather than lures, 
increasing confidence alongside accuracy. Here we argue that to reveal 
confidence-accuracy dissociations, evidence supporting lures – affecting 
accuracy but not confidence – needs to be varied across experimental 
conditions. Consequently, in Experiment 3 we designed conditions 
under which target strength was held constant while support for lures 
was varied. In Experiment 3, we included three types of recognition 
tests. We once again administered associative and item recognition tests, 
but this time we supplanted them with an item + association test in 
which participants were asked to distinguish between intact pairs and 
pairs consisting of two unfamiliar, not-previously-presented words (see 
Fig. 1). Because in this experiment feedback was not provided, we ex-
pected to replicate the cross-over pattern of accuracy and confidence 
that we first showed in our comparison of associative and item recog-
nition tests in Experiment 1. 
The crucial novel predictions concern the comparison between the 
associative and item + association test. These two tests hold targets 
constant, while varying only the nature of lures, with the associative test 
using rearranged pairs and the item + association test using novel pairs. 
With a difference in support for the lures, we predicted better recogni-
tion performance for the item + association test than for the associative 
test. We predict this on the basis that a difference in evidence supporting 
targets (equated across tests) and lures (larger for the associative 
recognition test) should favor correct responding in the item + associ-
ation test. However, we also predicted that confidence would not track 
accuracy for this comparison. Specifically, assuming that confidence 
reflects solely support for the chosen alternative, we predicted that 
confidence in correct endorsements should be generally equated across 
these two tests that employ the same targets. 
Notably, while a comparison of the associative and item + associa-
tion tests allows for assessing confidence and accuracy across tests with 
the same targets but different lures, the present design allows also for the 
comparison of the item + association and item recognition tests, which 
has the potential to provide important insights. This comparison in-
cludes the same lures – novel pairs – but different targets, which are 
rearranged pairs for the item test and intact pairs for the item + asso-
ciation test. If confidence depends on the evidence supporting targets, 
the comparison of these two tests should yield a difference in confidence 
in correct responses, which should be higher for the item + association 
tests, when targets match memory records of both individual words and 
an association linking them. 
The predictions made for the present experiment are not particularly 
novel inasmuch as the item + association test was also included in the 
study by Beaman et al. (2014). The patterns obtained there are – in 
hindsight – exactly as predicted by the absolute account of confidence in 
forced-choice recognition. While memory performance was higher in 
the item + association test (a difference of 10 percentage points), con-
fidence (combined across correct and incorrect responses in this study) 
was almost exactly equal across these tests. Also, confidence was higher 
in the item + association test than in the item test. However, as noted 
earlier, the auditory distraction paradigm used by Beaman et al. was not 
designed explicitly to test the absolute evidence hypothesis. Here we 
provide a direct test of this hypothesis, eliminating all features of the 
design used by Beaman et al. that are not germane to the confidence- 
accuracy relationship, removing a confound between the type of test 
and item repetition within a test and focusing on confidence in correct 
responses, to which the predictions of the absolute account of confi-
dence in forced-choice recognition directly apply. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two students and graduates of universities located in Wars-
zawa and Łódź, Poland, were tested for monetary compensation. The 
sample size was increased in comparison to Experiment 2 to ensure good 
power for detecting differences in performance across tests, while also 
providing meaningful data with respect to the predicted null effect on 
confidence. 
Materials, design, and procedure 
Seven hundred and twenty Polish words were chosen from the fre-
quency norms by Mandera, Keuleers, Wodniecka, and Brysbaert (2015). 
They were randomly paired to create 360 word-pairs, out of which 240 
were divided into six study lists with 40 pairs per list and the remaining 
120 pairs were divided into six sets of 20 to be used as lures in recog-
nition tests. Participants studied six lists, each followed by a recognition 
test. There were three different types of test, each completed for two 
different study lists. The associative and item recognition tests were the 
same as in the respective short test conditions of Experiments 1 and 2. 
For the item + association test a randomly chosen half of study pairs 
were re-paired for each recognition trial to make novel pairs. Only short 
tests were used in the present experiment to avoid confounding the type 
of test and item repetitions across tests. The procedure for both the study 
phases and all recognition tests was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2, 
with studied pairs displayed for 1.5 s, with 500 ms interval, and un-
limited time to provide both recognition decisions and following con-
fidence judgments. 
Results and discussion 
The descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. Hit rates were sub-
jected to a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA, which revealed signif-
icant differences across test conditions, F(2, 62) = 8.96, MSE = .01, p <
.001, ηp2 = .224. This reflected higher accuracy in both the item recog-
nition test, t(31) = 2.83, p = .008, d = 0.50, and the item + association 
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recognition test, t(31) = 3.81, p < .001, d = 0.67, than in the associative 
recognition test, while performance did not significantly differ between 
item and item + association tests, t(31) = 1.03, p = .31, d = 0.18. 
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA on mean confidence judg-
ments for correct responses also revealed reliable differences across 
conditions, F(2, 62) = 5.18, MSE = 23.18, p = .008, ηp2 = .143. This 
reflected higher confidence in the associative recognition test, t(31) =
2.93, p = .006, d = 0.52, and in the item + association test, t(31) = 2.34, 
p = .026, d = 0.41, than in the item recognition test, while confidence in 
correct responses did not differ between associative and item + associ-
ation tests, t(31) = 0.765, p = .450, d = 0.13. 
A visual inspection of calibration curves (see Fig. 2) reveals two 
things. First, there is a positive relationship between confidence and 
accuracy on all types of tests, albeit less consistent for the associative 
and item + association tests at the highest levels of confidence. By and 
large, however, the plots again reveal meaningful relationships between 
accuracy and confidence within each test. Second, the curve for the 
associative recognition test is placed consistently lower than the plots 
for the two remaining test conditions across all levels of confidence 
showing a dissociation between confidence and accuracy across testing 
conditions. Once again, the calibration curves reveal that differences 
across testing conditions are not constrained to a subset of responses 
characterized by highest levels of confidence. 
These results replicate Experiment 1 in showing a cross-over pattern 
of accuracy and confidence when associative and item recognition tests 
are compared. While accuracy is clearly higher in the item recognition 
test (by 9 percentage points), confidence in correct responses is actually 
higher in the associative recognition test. As argued throughout the 
present paper, these results can be explained if one assumes that while 
difference in evidence supporting two test alternatives underlies dif-
ferences in accuracy across tests, confidence depends solely on evidence 
supporting the chosen alternative. The same absolute account of confi-
dence predicts that confidence should become dissociated from accuracy 
when the associative recognition test is compared against the item +
association test. While a difference in evidence supporting lures between 
these two tests should favor higher accuracy in the item + association 
test, the chosen correct alternative in these two tests is actually the same 
type of pair – intact – which should yield no difference in confidence if 
confidence does not take into account evidence supporting lures. This 
pattern was indeed observed. While accuracy was clearly higher in the 
item + association recognition test (by 11 percentage points), confi-
dence in correct responses was almost identical across these tests, with – 
if anything – numerically higher confidence for correct responses in the 
associative recognition test. Because here we argue for a null result, we 
also report a Bayesian t-test with uninformed priors for this comparison, 
conducted using JASP software (JASP Team, 2019), which yielded a 
Bayes Factor of 4.04. This means that the data are 4.04 times more likely 
under the null than the alternative hypothesis, which can be considered 
moderate evidence (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013) in favor of the null 
hypothesis. 
One additional confidence-accuracy dissociation occurred in the 
present experiment. When item and item + association tests were 
compared, accuracy was roughly equated, yet confidence in correct re-
sponses was somewhat higher in the item + association test than in the 
item recognition test. The pattern of confidence here is again as pre-
dicted by the absolute account. Because intact pairs match memory re-
cords better than rearranged pairs, higher confidence should be 
observed when the former are endorsed. At the same time, however, the 
accuracy pattern for this comparison requires some comment. If there is 
more evidence for targets in the item + association test than in the item 
test, why is there no difference in accuracy? After all, increasing the 
evidence for targets should affect the balance of evidence between tar-
gets and lures, which determines accuracy. 
There is a small numerical trend (2 percentage points) favoring ac-
curacy in the item + association test, so this null effect could reflect 
insufficient power and thus the obtained confidence-accuracy 
dissociation may be more apparent than real4. Power could be insuffi-
cient for this particular comparison because the difference in balance of 
evidence caused by changing targets from rearranged to intact pairs is 
likely to be fairly small. In the present study, we manipulated this bal-
ance primarily by changing lures across tests. A difference in memory 
evidence between two previously studied words (for a rearranged pair) 
and two novel words should be large as it maps onto a difference be-
tween something that was studied and something that is completely new 
in the experimental context. By contrast, a difference in memory evi-
dence between intact and rearranged pairs is likely to be much smaller 
because they both correspond to studied material. Such a small differ-
ence is unlikely to affect the balance of evidence substantially because it 
becomes diluted by noise coming from lures which are, on average, 
equated across conditions. By contrast, confidence – which depends 
solely on evidence supporting targets – may prove a much more sensitive 
measure of how well targets are remembered because confidence here is 
independent of evidence supporting lures (see Hanczakowski, 
Zawadzka, & Coote, 2014, for a similar argument). Hence, even if the 
strength of targets does affect balance of evidence, its influence may be 
much easier to detect in the measure of confidence, as it was in the 
present results. 
To summarize, we have presented clear evidence that confidence in 
forced-choice recognition depends on the evidence supporting the cho-
sen alternative, a mechanism that inevitably leads to confidence- 
accuracy dissociations because accuracy is determined by the balance 
of evidence between correct and incorrect alternatives. This novel evi-
dence for the absolute account of confidence chimes with recent studies, 
using methods very different from the current ones, yet also providing 
consistent support for the absolute account of confidence in both 
perceptual (Zylberberg et al., 2012) and memory decisions (Miyoshi 
et al., 2018; Zawadzka et al., 2017). It extends these findings by showing 
that patterns predicted by the absolute account appear across tests 
varying the nature of support for correct responding: associative infor-
mation in the associative recognition test, both item and associative 
information in the item + association test, and predominantly item in-
formation in the item recognition test. In all these tests confidence was 
based on evidence supporting the chosen alternative only, leading to 
confidence-accuracy dissociations across testing conditions. At the same 
time, it is vital to note another recent study devoted to the issue of 
confidence in forced-choice recognition, by Horry and Brewer (2016), in 
which the authors make a case for a relative account of confidence, 
where confidence depends on both evidence supporting targets and 
lures. We now turn to the discussion of their arguments, before pre-
senting an experiment attempting to reconcile our theoretical stance 
with theirs. 
Horry and Brewer (2016) shaped their experimental paradigm on the 
line-up procedure. Participants were presented with faces and each face 
was followed with a recognition trial in which participants were asked to 
select the just presented face from among a number of lures. The simi-
larity of lures to the target face was varied. For example, in their 
Experiment 1 – using the simplest variant of the procedure – participants 
were presented with a target face accompanied by a single lure face 
which was either similar or dissimilar to the target. Subsequent exper-
iments varied parameters such as the number of lures, whether the 
target was included in a recognition trial, and response options – 
allowing participants to ‘reject’ the trial if they thought the target face 
was not included. Independently of all these changes to the paradigm, a 
consistent pattern emerged such that increasing the similarity of lures to 
targets simultaneously decreased accuracy and reduced confidence in 
correct responses (when targets were endorsed). While the accuracy 
pattern is straightforwardly captured by the assumption that accuracy 
depends on the balance of evidence, the confidence pattern was 
4 Note that this difference was slightly larger (4 percentage points) and sta-
tistically significant in the study by Beaman et al. (2014). 
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interpreted by Horry and Brewer as consistent with the relative account 
of confidence, where confidence also depends on the balance of evi-
dence. Under this argument, more similar lures reduce the relative dif-
ference in evidence supporting targets and lures, thus reducing 
confidence. 
To understand why the results of Horry and Brewer (2016) do not 
necessarily provide support for the relative account of confidence, and 
can instead be accommodated by the absolute account, it is necessary to 
return to the study by Tulving (1981). So far, we have discussed a 
confidence-accuracy dissociation by which accuracy is higher in the A-X 
condition than in the A-B’ condition (due to differences in balance of 
evidence) but this is not reflected in confidence in correct responses (due 
to equated evidence for targets on which confidence is based). However, 
as mentioned earlier, Tulving showed another pattern in this study by 
which accuracy was higher in the A-A’ condition than the A-B’ condi-
tion, yet confidence in correct responses showed an opposite pattern, 
being higher in the A-B’ condition than the A-A’ condition. This pattern 
of results led Tulving to distinguish between two types of similarity, 
which we will refer to as memory similarity and choice similarity. Memory 
similarity refers to how similar a recognition alternative is to information 
stored in memory. In a line-up example, this might be how similar a line- 
up member is to the memory representation of the actual culprit. 
Essentially, this is what we have referred to as memory evidence 
throughout the present manuscript. Thus, memory similarity is 
responsible for patterns observed for the A-B’ and A-X conditions 
because it is the similarity of lures to memory representations that is 
varied across these pairs. Choice similarity refers to the similarity be-
tween alternatives included in a recognition trial. In the line-up example, 
if all members are bearded, or belong to the same ethnic group, then 
they are similar to each other on these dimensions regardless of how 
similar one or more members might also be to the culprit – who could be 
clean-shaven or a member of a different ethnic group5. The reinterpre-
tation of results obtained by Tulving suggests that memory similarity of 
lures does not affect confidence – equated across A-B’ and A-X condi-
tions – but confidence is affected by choice similarity. Participants 
report higher confidence when recognition alternatives within a recog-
nition trial are dissimilar to each other. 
The distinction between memory and choice similarity allows the 
results obtained by Horry and Brewer (2016) to be reconciled with the 
absolute account of confidence. As Horry and Brewer acknowledge, 
their procedure does not distinguish between memory and choice sim-
ilarity. Thus, in their low similarity condition, a lure was at the same 
time dissimilar from the target representation in memory and dissimilar 
from the target alternative in a given recognition trial. In this design, it is 
impossible to establish which type of similarity relationship drives dif-
ferences in confidence. The role of memory similarity would be consis-
tent with the relative account of confidence, but the role of choice 
similarity would mean that the results of Horry and Brewer (2016) may 
have no bearing on the distinction between absolute and relative ac-
counts of confidence. 
To argue that choice similarity can affect confidence requires more 
empirical support, which currently comes only from studies using the 
paradigm introduced by Tulving (1981). Here we attempted such a test 
using methods similar to the ones employed in Experiments 1–3. This 
served two aims. The first aim was to provide additional evidence for the 
idea that the patterns so far interpreted as supportive of the relative 
account of confidence (Horry & Brewer, 2016) may in fact reflect dif-
ferences in choice similarity across experimental conditions. The second 
aim was to provide additional specificity to the absolute account of 
confidence. As discussed throughout this paper, the absolute account 
states that confidence in forced-choice recognition depends on the evi-
dence supporting the chosen alternative, while ignoring the evidence 
supporting the unchosen alternative. This does not mean that unchosen 
alternatives are disregarded altogether, only that evidence supporting 
them as possible targets is not factored into confidence. Demonstrating 
that choice similarity affects confidence would thus serve to reveal how 
unchosen lures are capable of shaping confidence even though, as 
demonstrated throughout Experiments 1–3, their similarity to memory 
representations is irrelevant. 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 focused on the role of choice similarity—rather than 
memory similarity—in shaping confidence in forced-choice recognition 
using a setting comparing two variants of the associative recognition 
test. The first variant was the same as used in Experiments 1–3: on each 
recognition trial one intact pair and one recombined pair created from 
two words that were included in different studied pairs were pitted 
against each other. This was a condition of low-choice similarity. In the 
high-choice similarity condition, on each recognition trial an intact pair 
was pitted against a recombined pair which had the same first word as 
the intact pair but a different second word, taken from a different 
studied pair (see Fig. 1). A similar procedure was used in a study by 
Clark, Hori, and Callan (1993), who referred to the described conditions 
as NOLAP (no overlap across alternatives) and OLAP (overlap across 
alternatives). They found an accuracy advantage for forced-choice 
recognition for the NOLAP condition, but they did not include the 
confidence measure which is of main interest here. 
In the present design, the memory similarity of studied pairs is 
equated across high-choice and low-choice similarity conditions: they 
both use only studied words and both contrast one intact and one 
recombined pair. However, these testing conditions differ in choice 
similarity insofar as the use of the same first words across test pairs 
creates higher choice similarity compared to a condition of no overlap. If 
choice similarity determines confidence in forced-choice recognition, 
we predict lower confidence in correct responses in the high-choice 
similarity condition—an equivalent of the A-A’ condition in the study 
by Tulving (1981), as compared to the low-choice similarity con-
dition—an equivalent of the A-B’ condition. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-four students and graduates of universities located in Wars-
zawa and Łódź, Poland, participated in return for monetary compen-
sation. As we had no previous data from the same manipulation, we 
chose a sample size similar to that in our Experiment 1. 
Materials, design, and procedure 
A subset of 480 words from among Experiment 3 materials were 
chosen and assigned to six lists of 40 word pairs each. There were two 
types of tests: half the lists were followed by a low-choice similarity test, 
which was the same associative recognition test as in Experiment 3, and 
the other half of the lists were followed by a high-choice similarity 
recognition test, where each lure had the same first word as the intact 
pair used on the same test trial and the second word was chosen 
randomly from another pair, which did not serve as an intact pair in the 
test. The procedure for the present experiment was the same as in 
Experiment 3. 
Results and discussion 
A t-test comparing hit rates across the low- and high-choice similarity 
conditions failed to reveal a significant difference, t(43) = 1.61, p =
5 In the literature concerning line-ups, members of a line-up other than a 
suspect are referred to as foils or fillers, whereas the term ‘lure’ is sometimes 
used in reference to an innocent suspect – a person included in a line-up who is 
not a culprit. However, for the sake of consistency, here we use the term ‘lure’ 
to refer to incorrect alternatives present in a particular recognition trials in all 
types of recognition tests, including line-ups. 
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.115, d = 0.24. If anything, accuracy was numerically higher in the low- 
choice similarity (M = .78, SD = .18) compared to the high-choice 
similarity condition (M = .76, SD = .16). This difference was reliable 
in the study by Clark et al. (1993), albeit in a slightly different design, 
employing a three-alternative forced choice test. 
Of more importance, a t-test comparing confidence in correct re-
sponses revealed a significant difference, t(43) = 2.03, p = .048, d =
0.31, with higher confidence for the low-choice similarity condition (M 
= 89, SD = 9) than the high-choice similarity condition (M = 87, SD =
9). Because in the present experiment only associative recognition tests 
were administered and accuracy levels were roughly equated, this time 
we were able to also examine confidence in incorrect responses as most 
participants had data in all cells of the design. After excluding two 
participants with perfect performance in the low-choice similarity con-
dition, there was a significant difference in confidence in incorrect re-
sponses, t(41) = 3.04, p = .004, d = 0.47, with higher confidence again 
for the low-choice similarity (M = 72, SD = 2) than the high-choice 
similarity condition (M = 67, SD = 2). The calibration curves are pre-
sented in Fig. 2. They reveal generally similar and positive curves for 
both conditions, which diverge only at the highest levels of confidence, 
where participants seem to become relatively less confident in the high- 
choice similarity condition than in the low-choice similarity condition. 
The important conclusion from Experiment 4 is thus that choice 
similarity determines confidence in forced-choice recognition so that 
confidence is generally higher when alternatives within a given recog-
nition trial are less similar to each other. It seems that when memory and 
choice similarity are co-varied – as they were in the study by Horry and 
Brewer (2016) – lower confidence for more similar lures cannot be taken 
as evidence that confidence judgments are a product of the balance of 
evidence between chosen and unchosen alternatives. Under these con-
ditions, it is possible that confidence in correct responses is based only 
on evidence supporting targets, modulated by the similarity of alterna-
tives on a given recognition trial. The present series of experiments 
shows that while the similarity of a lure to a memory representation of 
any of the studied items does not impact confidence (Experiments 1–3), 
the degree to which a lure is similar to the target on a given recognition 
trial does (Experiment 4). A residual issue relates to the reasons why 
confidence is higher in the low-choice similarity compared to the high- 
choice similarity condition. There are at least two possibilities. 
First, Clark et al. (1993) obtained a parallel difference in accu-
racy—which was not reliable in our Experiment 4—and argued that this 
difference could be caused by increased recollection from using more 
studied items in the low choice similarity condition (the NOLAP con-
dition in their study). By this reasoning, every single studied item may 
serve as a cue for a pair in which this word was embedded at study. 
Recollection of original associations for words used in recombined pairs 
can be used as a cue for recall-to-reject processes (Rotello & Heit, 2000), 
allowing for correct responding. With more individual items used in the 
low-choice similarity condition, there is thus greater opportunity for 
recollection and this additional recollection can also increase confi-
dence. However, it is worth re-stating that the present experiment not 
only failed to replicate the accuracy advantage—which could be an issue 
of power that related to the Clark et al. study being better suited to 
revealing differences in accuracy (using three alternatives on each 
recognition trial) —but we also revealed, across experimental condi-
tions, differences in confidence in incorrect responses. This difference is 
difficult to account for by evoking recall-to-reject processes which 
should generally give rise to correct responses only, as recollective 
processes are generally assumed to do (Yonelinas, 1994). 
Another way of explaining reduced confidence in the high-choice 
similarity condition is to revisit the absolute account of confidence 
and consider it in light of the diagnostic feature-detection model of 
responding in line-ups developed by Wixted and Mickes (2014; see also 
Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, & Higham, 2014, for a similar approach to 
recognition tests). The diagnostic feature-detection model suggests that 
when all alternatives are presented together, not all of their features are 
treated with equal weight. Specifically, features shared across alterna-
tives are discounted in favor of features that uniquely point towards one 
of the alternatives being a target. A similar mechanism of discounting 
non-diagnostic features, coupled with the absolute account of confi-
dence, can be responsible for patterns of confidence discussed here. For 
the high-choice similarity condition, a non-diagnostic feature—a shared 
cue—can be discounted when arriving at a confidence judgment, thus 
reducing the overall strength of memory evidence on which confidence 
is based. Such discounting does not occur for the low-choice similarity 
trials, for which no features are shared across targets and lures. This 
account can explain the patterns for both correct and incorrect responses 
because the shared cue can be discounted as part of evidence supporting 
either the chosen target or the chosen lure. It has the advantage of 
explaining the whole pattern of confidence results obtained here while 
in theoretical terms having the distinction of linking successfully two 
accounts of responding in forced-choice recognition tests: the diagnostic 
feature-detection model and the absolute account of confidence. 
General discussion 
There is a common assumption— embedded in a number of models 
of recognition (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; 
Ratcliff & Starns, 2009)— that when formulating a confidence judgment 
in recognition tests, what participants take into account is the balance of 
evidence favoring the chosen option over the unchosen option. In the 
case of forced-choice recognition, this means a balance between memory 
evidence supporting two recognition probes, whereas – in the case of an 
old/new recognition test – it could also mean a balance between evi-
dence supporting two response options (“old” and “new”) for a single 
probe. The greater the balance in favor of the chosen option, the higher 
the confidence attached to it. At the same time, in forced-choice 
recognition, this balance of evidence determines how accurate 
responding will be because both more evidence for the correct, studied 
alternative and less evidence for the incorrect, unstudied alternative 
point to the correct alternative. In this formulation both confidence and 
accuracy are shaped by the same factor, resulting in a strong relationship 
between confidence and accuracy across experimental conditions for the 
forced-choice recognition tests. In other words, changing accuracy by 
changing the balance of evidence means a corresponding change in 
confidence. 
Evidence from the current series allows us to question these as-
sumptions. It shows that while accuracy in forced-choice recognition 
does depend on the balance of evidence supporting two recognition 
probes, confidence displays a confirmation bias, being based on evi-
dence supporting the chosen recognition probe only. While confirmation 
bias has been amply documented in other domains (Nickerson, 1998) it 
has been largely overlooked in the recognition memory literature. Only 
recently have studies begun to examine such formulations (Miyoshi 
et al., 2018; Zawadzka et al., 2017). As a result of this confirmation bias, 
confidence in forced-choice recognition may track accuracy within 
experimental conditions when differences in accuracy of different re-
sponses result from changes in evidence supporting correct alternatives, 
but confidence becomes dissociated from accuracy across experimental 
conditions when differences in accuracy result from changes in evidence 
supporting incorrect alternatives. 
In this study, we manipulated the types of test by which memory for 
studied pairs was assessed. All tests were administered in the forced- 
choice format but they differed in what constituted a target and what 
constituted a lure. In Experiments 1, 2 and 3, we documented a 
confidence-accuracy dissociation by comparing associative and item 
recognition tests. These tests differed not only in terms of targets: intact 
pairs in the associative recognition test and rearranged pairs in the item 
recognition test, but also lures: rearranged pairs in the associative 
recognition test and novel pairs in the item recognition test. Changing 
both targets and lures across tests led to a cross-over pattern of confi-
dence and accuracy, observed in Experiments 1 and 3: accuracy was 
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consistently higher in the item recognition test, while confidence in 
correct responses was higher in the associative recognition test. The 
confidence portion of this dissociation was eliminated in Experiment 2 
when feedback concerning recognition decisions was provided, favoring 
high confidence in the condition producing higher accuracy. Differences 
in accuracy across test conditions remain unsurprising giving the nature 
of lures on these tests. Rearranged pairs constitute much stronger lures 
than novel pairs, which means that the balance of evidence should more 
consistently favor targets in the item recognition than the associative 
recognition test. What is surprising, however, is that confidence does not 
track this difference. We argue that this is because confidence in correct 
responses reflects not the balance of evidence but evidence supporting 
targets only and this is stronger for associative recognition than item 
recognition tests. This is because targets in the associative recognition 
test cue both item information and associative information linking these 
items, while targets in the item recognition test tend to cue only item 
information. 
Additional support for the differential roles of target and lure 
strength in shaping accuracy and confidence comes from Experiment 3, 
in which another testing condition was included. In the item + associ-
ation test, participants were asked to distinguish between intact and 
novel pairs. When compared to the associative recognition test, the item 
+ association test has the same targets but different lures. Because ac-
curacy depends on the balance of evidence for these two alternatives, 
there was a difference in accuracy between associative and item + as-
sociation tests. However, because confidence does not depend on this 
balance, with equated targets there was no difference in confidence in 
correct responses across these tests. When compared to the item 
recognition test, the item + association test has the same lures but 
different targets. Here, there was no detectable difference in accuracy 
across these tests. This was likely because the balance of evidence is 
affected only slightly by relatively minor variations of strength of targets 
and becomes undetectable when noise associated with the lures is 
factored in. However, because confidence in correct responses is selec-
tively attuned to the variations of memory evidence supporting targets, 
there was still a pattern of higher confidence for the item + association 
test, in which targets cued both item and associative information in 
memory, than for the item recognition test, in which targets cued pre-
dominantly item information. 
The present results join a growing body of work showing that con-
fidence in forced-choice recognition reflects absolute evidence sup-
porting the chosen alternative. First inklings that confidence is focused 
on the evidence supporting the chosen alternative came from the liter-
ature on perception, where Zylberberg et al. (2012) showed such a 
pattern for judgments of movement direction. For some time the impact 
of this finding was not felt in the memory literature, focused as it is on 
manipulations introduced at encoding that vary the strength of targets 
rather than lures (but see Jou et al., 2016, for a relevant discussion). 
Zawadzka et al. (2017) overcame this problem with the use of the plurals 
paradigm, in which evidence for lures can be varied by varying the 
strength of the parent word and showed that confidence reflects the 
strength of the chosen alternative, while being independent of the 
strength of the unchosen alternative. Because Zawadzka et al. used a 
procedure with almost chance levels of performance, they were able to 
analyze meaningfully incorrect responses and found the same pattern: 
when a lure was chosen, confidence in this choice reflected the strength 
of the chosen lure, not the balance of evidence between the lure and the 
target on a given trial. A similar approach was recently adopted by 
Miyoshi et al. (2018), who varied the memorability of target pictures 
and focused on confidence in incorrect choices. The balance of evidence 
would predict that with growing memorability of targets, confidence in 
incorrect responses should be reduced. However, an opposite pattern 
was actually documented by Miyoshi et al., who showed that with 
increasing strength of targets, confidence in incorrect responses also 
increased. 
The pattern where increased strength of the unchosen alternative 
leads to increased rather than decreased confidence in the correctness of 
the chosen alternative is the exact opposite of what the balance of evi-
dence account of confidence would predict. However, is it what the 
absolute account would always predict? It is worth noting that such a 
pattern was not observed in the present study. In Experiment 3, a 
comparison between associative and item + association recognition 
tests held targets equal and varied the strength of lures, with this factor 
having no effect on confidence when targets were endorsed. By the 
absolute account of confidence, the greater strength of lures in the 
associative recognition test could make endorsed targets particularly 
strong, producing greater confidence in correct responses than for the 
item + association recognition test – the ‘skimming off’ of responses by 
strong but unchosen alternatives (Miyoshi et al., 2018). However, this 
pattern of ‘skimming off’ is not universal as it was not observed for the 
present Experiment 3, nor was it observed for the comparison of A – B’ 
and A – X pairs in the study by Tulving (1981). We suggest that these 
different outcomes reflect differences in the proportions of responses 
affected by the ‘skimming off’ by unchosen alternatives. Miyoshi et al. 
focused on incorrect responses, which are much less in evidence than 
correct responses in the most of recognition tests. The strength of any 
unchosen correct alternative has a large effect on the population of 
chosen—but incorrect—alternatives. Only the very strongest incorrect 
alternatives are endorsed when particularly strong correct items are 
present on the same recognition trial. By contrast, both Tulving (1981) 
in his study on picture recognition and we in the present Experiment 3 
focused on correct responses only. Changing the strength of the 
unchosen-incorrect alternative across tests has necessarily a propor-
tionally much smaller effect on the population of the chosen-correct 
alternatives. Whatever the difference in strength of lures, the majority 
of targets are endorsed anyway because on average they match memory 
better than either weak or strong lures. Thus, the fact that the majority of 
endorsed correct alternatives remain the same across conditions 
differing in the strength of unchosen incorrect alternatives is likely to 
undermine the possibility of detecting the ‘skimming off’ effects. This 
question awaits further research, but we note here that both the ‘skim-
ming off’ pattern and the situation in which confidence remains entirely 
unaffected by the strength of the unchosen alternative remain clearly 
inconsistent with the balance-of-evidence account of confidence. 
An important question that has not been addressed in the present 
study is why people would choose to disregard information contained in 
the unchosen alternative when making their confidence judgments. A 
hypothesis concerning the reason for the adoption of the absolute heu-
ristic for formulating confidence judgments in forced-choice test has 
been recently proposed by Miyoshi and Lau (2020). Using the Signal 
Detection Theory (SDT) approach to forced-choice recognition, Miyoshi 
and Lau showed by means of a series of simulations how metacognitive 
resolution – people’s ability to discriminate between their own correct 
and incorrect responses with their confidence judgments – depends on 
basic memory ability. Surprisingly, these simulations showed that there 
are conditions under which the absolute heuristic for formulating con-
fidence judgments – what Miyoshi and Lau referred to as basing confi-
dence on response-congruent evidence – leads to better metacognitive 
resolution of these judgments than using the balance-of-evidence 
approach. The conditions that favored the absolute heuristic were 
related to a ratio of variances associated with distributions of targets and 
lures. By increasing the ratio of target distribution variance to lure dis-
tribution variance, the benefits of the absolute heuristic outweigh the 
balance-of-evidence heuristic. Importantly, studies on recognition 
memory generally show that the standard deviation of the target dis-
tribution is indeed larger than the standard deviation of lure distribu-
tion, with the usual value of this ratio of approximately 1.25 (Mickes, 
Wixted, & Wais, 2007). The fact that in recognition memory tasks evi-
dence for targets is more variable than evidence for lures, and these are 
precisely the conditions which lead to benefits for metacognitive reso-
lution when confidence judgments are based on absolute evidence, 
suggests that the patterns observed here may be grounded in 
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participants’ drive towards metacognitive optimality. If using a certain 
strategy consistently leads to metamemory benefits, then adopting this 
strategy also in experimental conditions may be a result of life-long 
training. 
One point needs to be underscored regarding the issue of variances 
associated with evidence supporting targets and lures in forced-choice 
recognition tests – a crucial element contributing to potential benefits 
for metacognitive resolution of applying the absolute heuristic accord-
ing to the simulations presented by Miyoshi and Lau (2020). While this 
variance is generally higher for targets than for lures in single-item 
recognition of the type examined by Zawadzka et al. (2017) and 
Miyoshi et al. (2018), this difference seems particularly pronounced if 
targets, but not lures, are characterized by strong associative informa-
tion. Kelley and Wixted (2001) considered the variability of item and 
associative information in different variants of associative recognition 
tests. They established that the ratio of standard deviations of intact 
pairs and novel pairs in these tests is 2.0, compared to 1.25 observed for 
single item targets and lures. They argued that this higher ratio of var-
iances is generally due to a greater variability of associative compared to 
item information, with associative information contributing to detection 
of intact pairs but not rejection of lures in the form of novel pairs. 
Following the logic of Miyoshi and Lau, a test pitting against each other 
intact and novel pairs should thus be one that leads to a particularly 
strong benefit of using the absolute heuristic for the metacognitive 
resolution of confidence judgments. The fact that people indeed seem to 
use the absolute heuristic when providing confidence judgments in the 
item + association recognition test is consistent with the idea that this 
heuristic is used under conditions that are likely to promote greater 
metacognitive resolution than one that could be possibly achieved by 
applying the balance-of-evidence approach. 
At the same time, it is important to note that in order to account for 
the results of our study, it is necessary to assume that the same heuristic 
was used across all types of recognition tests. Only then can one fully 
describe the pattern obtained in Experiment 3, where tests with negli-
gible differences in terms of performance – item and item + association 
recognition – displayed differences in terms of confidence, while tests 
characterized by large differences in terms of performance – associative 
and item + association recognition – showed virtually no differences in 
terms of confidence. Kelley and Wixted’s (2001) observations regarding 
variability of associative information suggest that tests considered here 
must also have differed vastly in terms of variability across targets and 
lures. Cohn and Moscovitch (2007) considered the same types of tests as 
the ones employed in the present study and demonstrated that asso-
ciative information is likely to contribute both to evidence supporting 
targets (recall-to-accept) and evidence discrediting lures (recall-to- 
reject) in the associative recognition test, is likely to contribute via both 
automatic and strategic processing to evidence supporting targets in the 
item + association test, and is much less likely to contribute to evidence 
supporting targets in the item recognition test due to a disruption to 
automatic processing that does not transpire for rearranged words. All in 
all, the contribution of associative information to memory performance 
seems thus to diminish progressively from associative recognition, 
through item + association recognition, to item recognition. The fact 
that the absolute heuristic for formulating confidence judgments seemed 
to be used across all these tests indicates that the use of this strategy is 
not scaled to match the potential benefits for metacognitive resolution, 
which – as suggested by Miyoshi and Lau (2020) – should emerge mostly 
when associative information contributes much to target recognition but 
not to lure rejection – conditions most alike to those in the item + as-
sociation recognition test. 
This persistence of the absolute heuristic is also consistent with the 
results of Zawadzka et al. (2017), who showed that it explains the pat-
terns of confidence across recognition trials in a forced-choice recogni-
tion test for single items in which variances of targets and lures were 
kept constant (because additional repetitions of targets did not lead to 
increased variance, see Starns, & Ratcliff, 2014). Taken together, the 
work by Miyoshi and Lau (2020) indicates the specific conditions under 
which the absolute heuristic is likely to produce superior metacognitive 
resolution, and thus goes a long way towards explaining why people 
may be not motivated to factor evidence supporting the unchosen 
alternative into their confidence judgments. However, it seems that the 
absolute heuristic might well be a very general strategy for rendering 
confidence judgments, observed across tests for various stimuli like 
single words (Jou et al., 2016; Zawadzka et al., 2017), pictures (Miyoshi 
et al., 2018; Tulving, 1981), pairs of words, and consequently also in 
tests in which stimuli may be characterized by various levels of contri-
butions of item and associative information. The issue of boundary 
conditions – if any – of using this heuristic for confidence judgments 
needs to be the topic of further research. 
We started the present paper with examples from the area of 
eyewitness memory, where – in the case of line-ups – the role of confi-
dence judgments has been underscored in recent years (see Wixted et al., 
2015). As highlighted earlier, there is now a growing consensus that 
confidence judgments should be elicited when testimonies and identi-
fications are made because such judgments tend to be informative, being 
generally related to accuracy of memory responses, at least when 
memory is tested for the first time (Wixted & Wells, 2017). Although the 
present work has been concerned with somewhat artificial versions of 
forced-choice recognition procedures, seemingly far removed from the 
case of line-ups, its results may have some bearing on the understanding 
of confidence judgments in this more applied setting. First, across our 
four experiments we plotted calibration curves which revealed that 
indeed more accurate responding seemed to be related to greater con-
fidence within each of the recognition test we administered. This general 
result confirms that confidence is informative with regards to accuracy. 
At the same time, the patterns of cross-conditions dissociations do not 
remain without consequences for anyone who is interested in inter-
preting another person’s confidence judgments. Looking again at cali-
bration curves, it is important to note that while confidence remains 
predictive of accuracy within a given test, the tests themselves differ 
widely in terms of average levels of confidence quite independently of 
differences in accuracy. While people may be quite accurate when 
responding based on familiarity of individual words, as in the item 
recognition tests examined here, they are unlikely to be particularly 
confident in these decisions. This observation joins previous reports 
showing that familiarity-based decisions are generally characterized by 
low confidence, whether rendered with regard to faces (Reinitz, Séguin, 
Peria, & Loftus, 2012) or pictures (Reinitz et al., 2011). Also, while 
people may be relatively inaccurate when responding in the face of 
misleading lures, as in the associative recognition tests, they are likely to 
be confident in a quite unwarranted way. This highlights the importance 
of considering the context in which recognition decisions are made for 
understanding the meaning of confidence judgments. A misleading 
context in the form of similar lures is very likely to undermine the ac-
curacy of recognition responses, but this is unlikely to find its reflection 
in confidence judgments, making them less than reliable indicator of 
accuracy. 
This last argument seems at first blush particularly relevant to the 
issue of line-up identifications in which the question of similarity of 
lures—whether a line-up can be called fair—received much attention 
from researchers (e.g., Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & Bri-
macombe, 1998). Indeed, we have discussed at length the study by 
Horry and Brewer (2016), who manipulated lure similarity across 
recognition procedures that were built largely based on the structure of 
line-ups and showed that greater lure similarity undermined confidence 
when targets were endorsed. We argue that memory evidence support-
ing lures does not impact upon confidence, but their similarity to the 
target present in the particular recognition trial – choice similarity – 
does affect confidence, with greater similarity leading to lower confi-
dence, as shown in our Experiment 3. However, our recognition pro-
cedure differs from the line-up procedure in two important points. First, 
it does not include either trials for which targets would be absent – 
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similar to line-ups including an innocent suspect but not the culprit – nor 
does it provide an option to respond ‘neither’, which would be similar to 
rejecting a line-up. It is worth noting that a recent model-fitting study, 
using an SDT approach to line-ups, revealed that confidence in line-up 
decisions is well described by the balance-of-evidence approach (Wix-
ted, Vul, Mickes, & Wilson, 2018). It is possible that a crucial difference 
underlying our results with recognition tests on the one hand and line- 
ups on the other is based on the availability of different response op-
tions in these tasks. This hypothesis could be tested in future studies 
employing recognition tests built to be similar to line-up procedures and 
thus including options to ‘reject’ recognition trials. Such a variant of 
recognition testing was recently developed by Finley, Wixted, and 
Roediger (2020) and can be used to bring closer the currently discrepant 
studies on metacognitive judgments in the recognition and line-up 
domains. 
Another way in which our recognition tasks differ from line-ups is 
that whereas we presented our participants with a large number of 
recognition trials, eyewitnesses are usually provided only with a single 
line-up. When there are multiple recognition trials, it is possible to at 
least partially disentangle choice similarity and similarity between 
probes and related memory representations. On a given trial, a lure can 
be similar to the target on the same trial, similar to a different target, or 
dissimilar to all targets, very much like in the procedure used by Tulving 
(1981). In a line-up task, a lure that is similar to the memory repre-
sentation of the target is also similar to the target – or its substitute in a 
target-absent line-up – presented in the given line-up because there is 
actually only a single target. Thus, in line-ups, memory and choice 
similarity are almost necessarily confounded in the same way they were 
confounded in the study by Horry and Brewer (2016). Under these cir-
cumstances, the distinction between choice and memory similarity be-
comes irrelevant because on any account similar lures should undermine 
confidence, as Horry and Brewer demonstrated. Our study provides 
important novel insights regarding the basis of confidence in forced- 
choice recognition but also highlights the need to consider the particu-
lars of a given recognition task to make inferences regarding the role of 
lures in shaping confidence. 
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